Supreme Court cases that changed America —. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). But here the DNA report sought, not to accuse petitioner, but instead to generate objectively a profile of a then-unknown suspect’s DNA from the semen he left in committing the crime. That distinction is constitutionally significant because the scope of the confrontation right is properly limited to extrajudicial statements similar in solemnity to the Marian examination practices that the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent. And as is true of many hearsay statements that fall within any of the 20 or more hearsay exceptions, cross-examination could sometimes significantly help to elicit the truth. That was enough. See NY County DAO Brief 7–8; NDAA Brief 22–23; Innocence Network Brief 13–23; see also Dept. Third, the admissible evidence left little room for argument that the sample tested by Cellmark came from any source other than the victim’s vaginal swabs.7 This is so because there is simply no plausible explanation for how Cellmark could have produced a DNA profile that matched Williams’ if Cellmark had tested any sample other than the one taken from the victim. The record does not support such an understanding; no trial judge is likely to be so confused; and the admissible evidence left little room for argument that Cellmark’s sample came from any source but L. J.’s swabs, since the profile matched the very man she identified in a lineup and at trial as her attacker. Relying on these Rules, the State contends that the facts on which an expert’s opinion relies are not to be considered for their truth, but only to explain the basis of his opinion. On its own authority, the Florida Supreme Court has revisited and reversed its 2017 opinion and approved using the “Daubert” standard in the procedural evidence … Pp. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, an expert could render an opinion based only on facts that the expert had personally perceived or facts that the expert learned at trial, either by listening to the testimony of other witnesses or through a hypothetical question based on facts in evidence. Proc. SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.5 Fed. . But that is incorrect. If the statement is true, then the conclusion based on it is probably true; if not, not. the witnesses against him.”. Case packs for landmark SCOTUS rulingsdeveloped specifically for middle school students, NEW DocumentaryThe Supreme Court and the 1876 Election. See 1 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §14, p. 87 (6th ed. 703. And that testimony fits the relevant timeline. While it was once the practice for an expert who based an opinion on assumed facts to testify in the form of an an- swer to a hypothetical question, modern practice does not demand this formality and, in appropriate cases, permits an expert to explain the facts on which his or her opinion is based without testifying to the truth of those facts. These allegations give respondent fair notice of what petitioner’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper pleading standard for employment discrimination cases,2 and now reverse. That view understands the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford to bar the admission of “[t]estimonial” statements made out of court unless the declarant is unavail-able and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Appx. The Kocak incident illustrates how the Clause is designed to work: Once confronted, the analyst discovered and disclosed the error she had made. 44–49 (1997); see also M. Hale, History of the Common Law of England 258 (1713) (explaining virtues of confronting witness); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373 (1768) (same). See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S., at 319 (citing Garrett & Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. The question in this case … See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). Defense counsel lodged an objection “to the form of the question,” but the trial judge overruled it. But after undergoing cross-examination, the analyst realized she had made a mortifying error. This edition of Florida Evidence Courtroom Manual contains all changes to the Florida Evidence Code through the 2019 Florida Legislative Session, provides updated commentary on recent developments, and includes dozens of new Florida cases ... 3 The plurality asserts (without citation) that I am “reach[ing] the truly remarkable conclusion that the wording of Lambatos’ testimony confused the trial judge,” ante, at 19, and then spends three pages explaining why that conclusion is wrong, see ante, at 19–21. App. She offered no other statement for the purpose of identifying the sample used for Cellmark’s profile or establishing how Cellmark handled or tested the sample. ].” App. Id., at 150, 939 N. E. 2d, at 282. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73. In Bryant, another police-interrogation case, we explained that a person who makes a statement to resolve an ongoing emergency is not acting like a trial witness because the declarant’s purpose is not to provide a solemn declaration for use at trial, but to bring an end to an ongoing threat. in Bullcoming, O. T. 2010, No. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305 (2009), the Commonwealth introduced a laboratory’s “ ‘certificates of analysis’ ” stating that a substance seized from the defendant was cocaine. The Cases. She emphasized that “this [was] not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence.” 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (opinion concurring in part) (citing Fed. To fill that gap, the prosecutor could have called the analyst from Cellmark to testify about the DNA profile she had produced from the swabs. Lambatos, after all, had absolutely nothing to do with the collection of the sample from the victim, its subsequent handling or preservation by the police in Illinois, or its shipment to and receipt by Cellmark. Bryant Willerson was convicted of murder in connection with the beating death of William McClain. I hope he is right. and Supp. 116, 170 Eng. In trying Kocak, the State would have to look elsewhere for its evidence. State of Gujarat, (2021) 3 SCC 12] Service Law — Pension — Entitlement to pension: In this case, the clarification of Supreme Court judgment dt. by Vince Quill 7 months ago 7 months ago. The dissent insists that the Bullcoming report and Cellmark’s report are equally formal, separated only by such “minutia” as the fact that Cellmark’s report “is not labeled a ‘certificate.’ ” Post, at 22–23 (opinion of Kagan, J.). This conclusion will not prejudice any defendant who really wishes to probe the reliability of the DNA testing done in a particular case because those who participated in the testing may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at trial. In concluding that petitioner’s DNA profile matched the profile derived from L. J.’s swabs, Lambatos relied on Cellmark’s out-of-court statements that its profile was in fact derived from those swabs, rather than from some other source. . It may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular case before discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence. Today’s holding, however, will reach beyond scientific evidence to ordinary out-of-court statements. Those decisions are not challenged in this case and are to be deemed binding precedents, but they can and should be distinguished on the facts here. The trial judge agreed, noting, “If she says she didn’t do her own testing and she relied on a test of another lab and she’s testifying to that, we will see what she’s going to say.” Ibid. Lambatos opined that petitioner’s DNA profile matched the male profile derived from L. J.’s vaginal swabs. (1) Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 permits an expert to base his opinion on facts about which he lacks personal knowledge and to disclose those facts to the trier of fact. . When the work of a lab is divided up in such a way, it is likely that the sole purpose of each technician is simply to perform his or her task in accordance with accepted procedures. The prosecution sought to rebut this claim by showing that the defendant’s confession differed significantly from the accomplice’s. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). At the ISP lab, a forensic scientist received the sealed kit. Court confirms sentence for assault of 13-year-old. In particular, the States could create an exception that presumptively would allow introduction of DNA reports from accredited crime laboratories. As the plurality points out, ante, at 28–33, the introduction of statements of this kind does not risk creating the “principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 50. The same appeals court ordered that sensitive details in that suit must be segregated from other information that potentially could be used as evidence in the case. Once one abandons the traditional rule, there would seem often to be no logical stopping place between requiring the prosecution to call as a witness one of the labora-tory experts who worked on the matter and requiring the prosecution to call all of the laboratory experts who did so. Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability under Rev. In affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit relied on its settled precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802. This is a list of cases before the United States Supreme Court that the Court has agreed to hear and has not yet decided. Future argument dates are in parentheses; arguments in these cases have been scheduled, but have not, and potentially may not, take place. It has been said that “[t]he difficulty with the Wigmore-Harlan view in its purest form is its tension with much of the apparent history surrounding the evolution of the right of confrontation at common law.” White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). But that clear rule is clear no longer. An ambulance took L. J. to the hospital, where doctors treated her wounds and took a blood sample and vaginal swabs for a sexual-assault kit. 703, 28 U. S. C. Upon discovering the error, the analyst corrected her testimony. In Melendez-Diaz, we held that “[t]he text of the [Sixth] Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor.” 557 U. S., at 313–314. So the State tried another route—introducing the substance of the report as part and parcel of an expert witness’s conclusion. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. 1 Because we review here a decision granting respondent’s motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Argued January 15, 2002—Decided February 26, 2002. In Bullcoming, the report, though unsworn, included a “Certificate of Analyst” signed by the forensic analyst who tested the defendant’s blood sample. headed a ‘report.’ ” Ibid. But the mere existence of that question is no reason to wrongly decide the case before us—which, it bears repeating, involved the testimony of not twelve or six or three or one, but zero Cellmark analysts. But, in this case, there is no indication that Cellmark’s statements were offered “in order to evade confrontation.” Id., at 840. Whether § 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and … 1–8. Thus, the distinction between those who make “inherently inculpatory” statements and those who make other statements that are merely “helpful to the prosecution” has no foundation in the text of the Amendment. Moreover, DNA testing itself has exonerated some defendants who previously had been convicted in part upon the basis of testimony by laboratory experts. When this disclosure occurs, “the underlying facts” are revealed to the jury “for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for [the expert’s] opinion” and not “for the truth of the matter asserted.” Id., at 176, 604 N. E. 2d, at 311. 2012). In subsequent cases, this Court has reiterated that the prima facie case relates to the employee’s burden of presenting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Virginia … That is hardly the typical emergency response. Supreme Court opinions are browsable by year and U.S. Reports volume number, and are searchable by party name, case title, citation, full text and docket number. When all is said and done, the Cellmark report is a testimonial statement. Accordingly, I have concluded that the Confrontation Clause reaches “ ‘formalized testimonial materials,’ ” such as depositions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or statements resulting from “ ‘formalized dialogue,’ ” such as custodial interrogation. Modern rules of evidence continue to permit experts to express opinions based on facts about which they lack personal knowledge, but these rules dispense with the need for hypothetical questions. . “Q Did you compare the semen . (a) There was no plausible reason for the introduction of Cellmark’s statements other than to establish their truth. 30-1-2018 … See also 385 Ill. App. S21A0706. A Chicago Police detective collected the kit, labeled it with an inventory number, and sent it under seal to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab. Following that course presumably would not constitute a “prosecutorial dodge,” “subterfuge,” “indirection,” the “neat trick” of “sneak[ing]” in evidence, or the countenancing of constitutional violations with “a wink and a nod.” See post, at 3, 16, 17, 12 (opinion of Kagan, J.). Modern evidence rules dispense with the need for hypothetical questions and permit an expert to base an opinion on facts “made known to the expert at or before the hearing,” though such reliance does not constitute admissible evidence of the underlying information. Under Illinois law, this putatively offending phrase was not admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that the matching DNA profile was “found in semen from the vaginal swabs.” Rather, that fact was a mere premise of the prosecutor’s question, and Lambatos simply assumed it to be true in giving her answer. Rather, Lam-batos used the Cellmark report only to indicate the underlying factual information upon which she based her independent expert opinion. 3 The small difference between what Lambatos actually said on the stand and the slightly revised version that the dissent would find un- objectionable shows that, despite the dissent’s rhetoric, its narrow argument would have little practical effect in future cases. Accordingly, the Clause reaches “formalized testimonial materials,” such as deposi tions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or statements resulting from “formalized dialogue,” such as custodial interrogation. The Court has thus interpreted the Confrontation Clause as prohibiting modern-day practices that are tantamount to the abuses that gave rise to the recognition of the confrontation right. Id., at 81–82. 49; the ISP occasionally sent forensic samples to Cellmark for DNA testing, ibid. 1923) (“If the witness is skilled enough, his opinion may be adequately obtained upon hypothetical data alone; and it is immate- rial whether he has ever seen the person, place or thing in question” (citation omitted)). Applying Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to plead a prima facie case of discrimination in order to survive respondent’s motion to dismiss. The trial court found petitioner guilty of the charges against him. Second, and more important, Lambatos also noted that the data making up the DNA profile would ex- hibit certain telltale signs if it had been deduced from a degraded sample: The visual representation of the DNA sequence would exhibit “specific patterns” of degradation, and she “didn’t see any evidence” of that from looking at the profile that Cellmark produced. The only differences are that Cellmark is a private laboratory under contract with the State (which no one thinks relevant), and that the report is not labeled a “certificate.” That amounts to (maybe) a nickel’s worth of difference: The similarities in form, function, and purpose dwarf the distinctions. 2006); E. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 119–127 (1956); 30 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §6324, pp. . Your browser does not support the audio element. Ibid. If any other items that might have contained Williams’ DNA had been sent to Cellmark or were otherwise in Cellmark’s possession, there would have been a chance of a mix-up or of cross-contamination. App., p. 361. House Democrats have filed a brief with the Supreme Court seeking access to grand jury evidence from the Justice Department's Russia investigation to determine if … It is the expert’s disclosure of those facts that raises Confrontation Clause concerns.2, Those concerns are fully applicable in this case. Ante, at 16–21. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203 2021 CO 62 Supreme Court Case No. When Lambatos referenced the report during her direct examination, she did so “for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for [her expert opinion],” not for the purpose of showing “the truth of the matter asserted” by the report. So to determine the validity of the witness’s conclusion, the factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-court statement on which it relies. 56. 2011); see also, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 6 N. Y. The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. With a structure that reflects the utility of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a teaching tool, Evidence: Cases, Commentary, and Problems, Second Edition, provides: succinct yet complete coverage cases that illustrate central concepts and ... Bryant Willerson was convicted of murder in … Some indications are to the contrary: In delivering his verdict, the judge never referred to the circumstantial evidence the plurality marshals, but instead focused only on Lambatos’s testimony. 59–60, 74, 86–87; see Brief for National District Attorneys Assn. Pp. Only the presence of “that particular scientist,” we reasoned, would enable Bullcoming’s counsel to ask “questions designed to reveal whether incompetence . We emphasized that if a statement is not made for “the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,” its admissibility “is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12). Welcome to The Supreme Court of Mississippi. As I just stated, the trial judge might well have ignored Lambatos’s statement about the Cellmark report and relied on other evidence to conclude that “the Cellmark profile was derived from the sample taken from the victim,” ante, at 19. to [the] male DNA profile [found in the database] that had been identified as having originated from Sandy Williams”? Adapting the example slightly, assume that the admissibility of the initial laboratory report into trial had been directly at issue. Id., at 61–62; Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242–243 (1895). Citing chapter and verse from various studies, we concluded that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation” and mistake. Rep., at 897. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. This test comports with history because solemnity marked the practices that the Confrontation Clause was designed to eliminate, namely, the ex parte examination of witnesses under English bail and committal statutes. Absent an evaluation of the risk of juror confusion and careful jury instructions, the testimony could not have gone to the jury. 116, 170 Eng. Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often conducted when it is not yet clear whether there is a particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial. 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Consider what Lambatos told the factfinder here: The DNA in L. J.’s vaginal swabs matched Williams’s DNA and would match only “1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390 quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.” App. I reach this conclusion, however, solely because Cellmark’s statements lacked the requisite “formality and solemnity” to be considered “ ‘testimonial’ ” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Supreme Court ruling reverses the Portage County Court … But Justice Thomas’s approach grants constitutional significance to minutia, in a way that can only undermine the Confrontation Clause’s protections. We cannot review that interpretation and application of Illinois law. The foundational facts, that one of the profiles came from the defendant and that the other came from “ ‘the semen recovered from the victim’s vagina,’ ” were established not by expert testimony but by ordinary chain-of-custody evidence. Ante, at 16; see ante, at 2, 24–25. Rather, she simply relied for her knowledge of the fact upon Cellmark’s report. The report at issue here shows a DNA profile produced by an analyst at Cellmark’s laboratory, allegedly from a vaginal swab taken from a young woman, L. J., after she was raped. Both Illinois and Federal Rules bar an expert from disclosing the inadmissible evidence in jury trials but not in bench trials. 703; People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 175–176, 604 N. E. 2d 294, 310–311 (1992). Moreover, the precise requirements of the prima facie case can vary with the context and were “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. 1990). from the vaginal swabs of [the victim] to the male DNA profile [found in the database] that had been [derived] . This is the first time that the Supreme Court has considered the meaning of section 1. Finally, to bar admission of the out-of-court records at issue here could undermine, not fortify, the accuracy of factfinding at a criminal trial. “One can sympathize,” notes that treatise, “with a court’s desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is quite probably reliable, such as a routine analysis of a drug, but to pretend that it is not being introduced for the truth of its contents strains credibility.” Id., §4.10.1, at 198 (2d ed. There was evidence that the ISP lab sent L. J.’s vaginal swabs to Cellmark for testing and that Cellmark sent back a report containing a male DNA profile produced from semen taken from those swabs. Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 2, 12). 82—in other words, for the purpose of producing evidence, not enabling emergency responders. Petitioner’s main argument is that the expert went astray when she referred to the DNA profile provided by Cellmark as having been produced from semen found on the victim’s vaginal swabs. Two of these decisions involved scientific reports. Cellmark, in turn, did not send its report to the police until April 3, 2001, id., at 54, over a year after L. J.’s rape. Analyses prepared by various authorities on particular cases before the Supreme Court. 557 U. S., at 318. It is also unlikely that the judge took the testimony as providing chain-of-custody evidence. In fact, the testing showed only that the crime-scene DNA matched a sample of the victim’s DNA, not the defendant’s DNA. DNA evidence is usually the prosecutor’s most powerful weapon, and a prosecutor is unlikely to relinquish it just because he must bring the right analyst to the stand. No. The issue here is whether petitioner’s confrontation right was violated, not whether the State offered sufficient foundational evidence to support the admission of Lambatos’ opinion. 3d, at 369, 895 N. E. 2d, at 969–970 (“Cellmark’s report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis for Lambatos’ opinion”) The Supreme Court of Illinois also affirmed. For another thing, the fact that the laboratory testing takes place behind a veil of ignorance makes it unlikely that a particular researcher has a defendant-related motive to behave dishonestly, say, to misrepresent a step in an analysis or otherwise to misreport testing results. Consider a prosaic example not involving scientific experts. In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the im- portance of the fact that the forensic report had been admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter it asserted. See Bryant, 562 U. S., at ___ (Scalia, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–3). Second, the prosecutor asked whether Lambatos had in-dependently “compare[d the DNA profile that Cellmark had derived from] the semen that had been identified . 7 Our point is not that admissible evidence regarding the identity of the sample that Cellmark tested excuses the admission of testimonial hearsay on this matter. The laboratory’s final report mixed up the labels. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” 507 U. S., at 168. See ante, at 14–18; People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 175–177, 604 N. E. 2d 294, 311 (1992). Cellmark’s report is marked by no such indicia of solemnity. Later, Lambatos testified at trial, where the prosecutor asked her three relevant questions. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. The Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of this kind of evidence because allowing it would deprive a defendant of the ability to cross-examine the witness. The perpetrator forced her into his car and raped her, then robbed her of her money and other personal items and pushed her out into the street. and Supp. Innocence Network Brief 3. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”, 4 These requirements are exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms, which “are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.” Fed. To help rebut that defense, the State introduced the other confession into the record, so the jury could see how it differed from Street’s. . 300–301 (1997) (hereinafter Wright); 1 K. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence §14, p. 86 (6th ed. Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting. Ill. Rule Evid. 802, hearsay evidence isn’t admissible except under certain circumstances. When lab technicians are asked to work on the production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the consequences of their work will be. Ibid. L. Rev. Presumably the plurality would agree that such testimony violates the Confrontation Clause unless the eyewitness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. Pp. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U. S. ___ (2012). Furthermore, Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits. Others, however, maintain that a complaint must contain factual allegations that support each element of a prima facie case. Rule 9(b), for example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or mistake.3 This Court, however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts. No trial judge would take Lambatos’ testimony as furnishing “the missing link” in the State’s evidence regarding the identity of the sample that Cellmark tested. This commonsense conclusion is not undermined by any historical practice exempting expert basis testimony from the rigors of the Confrontation Clause. 3–4 (“I’m a little hysterical right now, but I think . Id., at 58. An order issued by a 3JX panel applies to the parties in that particular case only; it does not serve as precedent for any other case. In Melendez-Diaz, this Court rejected identical arguments, noting extensive documentation of “[s]erious deficiencies . Accordingly, in jury trials, both Illinois and federal law generally bar an expert from disclosing such inadmissible evidence.2 In bench trials, however, both the Illinois and the Federal Rules place no restriction on the revelation of such information to the factfinder. Lab technicians producing a DNA profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will turn out to be incriminating, exonerating, or both. Id., at 411–412. If the judge does not consider the testimony for its truth, the effect is precisely the same. . Moreover, should the defendant provide good reason to doubt the laboratory’s competence or the validity of its accreditation, then the alternative safeguard of reliability would no longer exist and the Constitution would entitle defendant to Confrontation Clause protection. 56. For example, if the factfinder were to suspect that the expert relied on factual premises with no support in the record, or that the expert drew an unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied, then the probativeness or credibility of the expert’s opinion would be seriously undermined. These standards are not foolproof. 3–9. An expert witness referred to the report not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the report, i.e., that the report contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator’s DNA, but only to establish that the report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner’s blood. 91. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 80 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). In addition, it states claims upon which relief could be granted under Title VII and the ADEA.
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